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These two books, The Palestinians in 
Israel: The Conflict Within by Ilan Peleg 
and Dov Waxman and Arab Minority 
Nationalism in Israel: The Politics of 
Indigeneity by Amal Jamal, central-
ize the question of the status of the 
Palestinian minority inside Israel. Both 
books agree that minority members are 
granted an inferior second-class citizen-
ship. This question is not merely conse-
quential to the prospects of peace and 
reconciliation in the conflict between 
Zionism and the Palestinian national 
movement over the West Bank and 
Gaza. Rather, its ramifications extend to 
the character of the state of Israel inde-
pendently of the peace process. In order 
to address this question, a significant 
change should occur. The books offer 
different perspectives regarding the 
nature of this change. 
Peleg and Waxman approach the 
problem from the perspective of the 
looming instability of the Israeli order if 
the Palestinian citizens’ situation is not 
significantly improved. The book reads 
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as a policy proposal for the Israeli gov-
ernment to “improve Israel’s ability to 
manage the conflict” (p. 188). The au-
thors reject binationalism as an alterna-
tive to Israel’s ethnic structure. Instead, 
they argue for three primary changes 
within the two-state solution. First, Is-
rael should change its definition from 
“Jewish and democratic” to the allegedly 
more inclusive “Jewish homeland and 
a state of all its citizens” (in this order) 
(p. 179); second, Israel should recog-
nize the Palestinian minority as a na-
tional minority, improve its conditions, 
and grant it culturally based collective 
rights; and third, the Palestinian citizens 
should volunteer in a “civilian service” 
(p. 172) to allay Jewish concerns about 
their loyalty.
Although Peleg and Waxman ac-
knowledge the tension between Israel’s 
Jewishness and its democratic aspira-
tions, they continue to consider Israel 
as a democracy, albeit an “ethnic de-
mocracy” (p. 137) or a “democracy with 
flaws” (pp. 129, 195). They mischar-
acterize this tension as one between 
republicanism and liberalism (i.e., be-
tween the common good as understood 
by majorities and individual rights that 
constrain majority aspirations). Such 
conflict is the normal state of affairs in 
any constitutional democracy. However, 
Israel’s contradiction is different: it is 
between popular will and ethnic struc-
tures that subordinate this civic will to 
the good as perceived by the ethnically/
religiously/extraterritorially conceived 
nation. 
Given this misdiagnosis, it is unsur-
prising that the authors offer reformist 
suggestions that retain the inegalitar-
ian structure. Despite their talk about 
“fundamental transformation” (p. 193), 
they seek to preserve the Jewish charac-
ter of the state under a different guise. 
While they argue that the tension is ir-
resolvable and they seek only to man-
age it and minimize its effects, they 
declare that a combination of individual 
and collective rights can provide a “so-
lution” to “long-term ethnic conflicts” 
(p. 156). They seek a “middle ground” 
that balances the “reasonable” demands 
of both Jews and Palestinians (p. 7). In 
such a “solution,” nothing is sacrificed 
and equality can coexist with prefer-
ence to Jews (in crucial questions like 
citizenship, nationality, and immigra-
tion policies as well as the existence 
of Jewish-only institutions) and hence 
Jewishness is not reduced. Such a so-
lution stabilizes the Israeli regime and 
improves its already-democratic system. 
This solution, then, is one of degree, 
not kind. It seeks only to tinker with 
the status quo in order to preserve its 
foundational elements.
Peleg and Waxman’s argument for 
retaining Jewish features in the state’s 
definition (pp. 173–74) commits the 
logical fallacy of inferring the “is” from 
the “ought.” David Hume has warned 
centuries ago against deducing norma-
tive judgments from descriptive judg-
ments. Yet the authors derive from the 
factual (that it is “unrealistic to be-
lieve that the Jewish majority will give 
up its insistence” on a Jewish defini-
tion of the state) a normative judgment 
(that the Jewish “connection” to Israel 
“ought to be reaffirmed”). But the nor-
mative argument does not necessarily 
follow from the factual. Furthermore, 
even if the factual judgment were cor-
rect, one would need an additional ar-
gument to establish why such fact is 
normatively consequential. There are 
facts that one would not take into ac-
count because they are normatively 
objectionable or irrelevant. Neverthe-
less, the authors decline to provide 
normative justifications for factual and 
descriptive judgments as if these were 
self-evidently justified (as in reference 
to the majority’s insistence on the Jew-
ishness of the state on p. 192).
Another example is the invocation 
of the concept of “loyalty” (pp. 172, 
182) as a justification for demanding 
voluntary national service from Arab 
citizens. Here, the mere fact that the 
majority has concerns about loyalty is 
perceived as a sufficient argument for 
the need for measures, albeit volun-
tary, to prove loyalty. The authors im-
plicitly assume, without an argument, 
that the majority’s concerns about Ar-
abs’ loyalty are descriptively grounded 
and hence need to be answered. But if 
such concerns are no more than mis-
conceptions and distortions of reality, 
it is unclear why they should be at all 
consequential. In any event, to be able 
to judge whether these concerns are 
justified, one needs to define loyalty. 
JPS4103_08_Recent Books.indd   127 6/5/12   10:30 AM
128 JouRnal of Palestine studies
Yet loyalty is never really explained 
in the book. Does it denote obedience 
to the law or patriotism? Is it a char-
acter trait or an emotional identifica-
tion? Further, it is not clear how the 
contradictory nature of the state would 
influence demands for loyalty. Should 
the Arab citizens be loyal to the “Jew-
ish homeland” or to the “democratic 
state”? Would this mean that the Jew-
ish citizens must also be loyal to the 
“democratic” nature of the state rather 
than to the Jewish homeland tout 
court? Moreover, even if the major-
ity’s concerns are descriptively accu-
rate, the question remains whether and 
when are the majority and the state 
justified in demanding loyalty from mi-
nority members. 
Another example for unsupported 
assertions is the argument that ethno-
centric definitions of the state “reflect 
the notion that Jews deserve a state of 
their own” (p. 174). It is unclear on what 
grounds do Jews (as opposed to, say, 
Israelis or Israeli Jews) deserve (as op-
posed to, say, need or have an interest 
in) a state of their own (as opposed to 
a state in which they can exercise their 
individual and collective rights). Hav-
ing an interest in something does not 
necessarily give rise to a right in it that 
would correspond to a duty on others 
to provide it. My interest in eating ice 
cream, for instance, does not give rise 
to a right to obtain ice cream. And even 
if a legal right existed, that does not 
necessarily mean that it should be exer-
cised especially when it violates others’ 
rights. Peleg and Waxman fail to make 
an argument. 
Their arguments fall prey to formal-
ism (or conceptualism). Peleg and Wax-
man assume that abstract concepts 
(like defining the state a Jewish home-
land rather than Jewish state) have a 
determinate meaning and dictate spe-
cific outcomes. It is evident, however, 
that definitions in themselves do not 
“impose[] . . . prescriptive or legal de-
mands” (p. 179). Abstract concepts need 
to be interpreted and applied by hu-
man beings. Therefore, the demands 
that may be imposed on behalf of con-
cepts depend on the normative inter-
pretations and practical applications of 
these concepts. These interpretations 
and applications are likely to change 
over time. Thus, a definition per se does 
not “move Israel to a more inclusive and 
more stable future” (p. 179). 
A similar formalist approach un-
derlies Peleg and Waxman’s rejection 
of the “liberal ideal” of a “state of all 
its citizens” (p. 155). Here the authors 
reject the ideal on grounds that it ig-
nores Israel’s circumstances and Zion-
ist demands. This is inconsistent with 
the later recognition of the diversity in 
practice in which collective rights have 
been recognized even under so-called 
“liberal individualistic” regimes (p. 178). 
The authors recognize the essential con-
testability of “democracy” (footnote in 
p. 191) but shy away from observing 
the same with respect to “liberalism” 
(p. 203). 
Finally, the authors invoke the di-
chotomy between extremists and mod-
erates without explaining the criteria 
for this dichotomy. This vagueness al-
lows them to lump together within the 
extremist camp and the worrisome de-
velopments both the rise of the fascist 
Avigdor Leiberman and the Palestinian 
“vision documents” that call for equal-
ity (pp. viii, 12). Against this backdrop, 
the authors represent their suggestions 
as the antidote to “extremists on both 
sides” (p. 213). 
Unlike Peleg and Waxman, Amal 
Jamal in his book Arab Minority Na-
tionalism in Israel: The Politics of In-
digeneity calls for a one-state solution 
in which Palestinian collective rights 
complement, rather than substitute, 
equal citizenship. For Jamal, collective 
rights are insufficient if not extended 
to include the distribution of politi-
cal power. Therefore, he criticizes the 
insufficiently critical scholarship that 
privileges the perspective of the ex-
isting Israeli ethnic political structure 
(as in Peleg and Waxman’s book). Un-
like Peleg and Waxman’s rhetorical 
invocation of the indigeneity of Pales-
tinian citizens, Jamal takes this char-
acterization seriously to question state 
sovereignty. 
Jamal’s book is an important contri-
bution to the study of the Palestinian 
citizens in Israel. It is methodologically 
rich, theoretically multilayered, and 
thematically wide ranging. The book 
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fruitfully utilizes interdisciplinary tools 
from subaltern studies, minority nation-
alism, social movements’ theory, and in-
terpretive phenomenology. The chapters 
address thoroughly a variety of subjects 
ranging from the theory of indigeneity, 
the politics of Arab indigeneity inside 
Israel, changing meanings of patriotism 
within the Palestinian minority, the ac-
tivism of internally displaced persons, 
the Arab leadership inside Israel, the 
vision documents, the rise of civic asso-
ciations, and the political philosophy of 
Azmi Bishara. 
There is much to admire in this im-
pressive, thought-provoking, and com-
prehensive study. The richness of the 
book, however, invites many questions. 
For instance, in the second chapter, 
Jamal takes for granted the accuracy 
of communitarian claims against lib-
eralism (regarding the lack of ground-
ing of individuals in social contexts). 
But these are highly disputed claims. 
John Rawls, Brian Barry, Will Kym-
licka, and Samuel Freeman argue that 
Michael Sandel’s claims conflate the 
hypothetical persons in the “original 
position” (who choose the principles 
of justice behind a “veil of ignorance” 
that excludes morally irrelevant consid-
erations) with actual persons. Rawls’s 
later work has emphasized the individ-
ual’s attachment to conceptions of the 
good. The main difficulty in this chap-
ter is the lack of distinction between 
liberal justice and liberal legitimacy. 
This is evident in lumping together 
Rawlsian “state neutrality” and “veil of 
ignorance” as if they both mandated 
the deployment of distributive justice 
regardless of historical context. For 
Rawls, however, the veil of ignorance 
is not invoked in the implementation 
and interpretation of the principles of 
justice nor in the establishment of con-
stitutional design. Furthermore, Rawls 
distinguishes between neutrality (i.e., 
impartiality toward conceptions of the 
good life held by private persons) “in 
effect” and neutrality “in aim.” Rawls 
demands only the latter. But that does 
not necessarily mandate a color-blind 
judicial approach (as liberals’ support 
for affirmative action demonstrates). 
Jamal argues that Palestinian citi-
zens’ participation in parliamentary 
elections “obscures the deep moral dis-
agreement between Arabs and Jews 
in regard to the conception of justice 
that stands behind the whole Israeli 
system” (p. 72). However, liberal con-
ceptions of legitimacy presuppose dis-
agreement over justice and thus open 
a gap between justice and legitimacy. 
Thus, even if one assumed that Israel is 
a legitimate state, that would not lead 
to the conclusion that it has a unified 
underlying conception of justice. Is-
rael, however, is not a legitimate state 
according to liberal theory precisely 
because it is not impartial toward con-
ceptions of the good and its consti-
tutional structure and public policies 
endorse and favor a Jewish form of life 
over non-Jewish forms of life. 
The fifth chapter of the book ana-
lyzes the Palestinian leadership inside 
Israel. Jamal emphasizes the personal-
ization of politics and the role of the 
extended family in politics (he terms 
the latter as “familicracy” and “clan 
culture”). He utilizes Hisham Shar-
abi and Halim Barakat’s ideas about 
the persistence of Arab patriarchal 
structures. Although Jamal acknowl-
edges the reductionism of the distinc-
tion between traditional and modern 
societies, he nevertheless uses this 
dichotomy by analyzing complex so-
ciopolitical circumstances as cultural 
attributes. The analytical utility of the 
distinction, however, is questionable. 
The treatment of Arab society as tra-
ditional obscures the fact that the dif-
ference between Western societies and 
Arab societies is only one of degree, 
not kind. Family structures and per-
sonalization are manifest in Western 
politics and economy (e.g., few Jewish 
families in Israel control a large part of 
the economy). Moreover, Jamal treats 
traditional social structures as static: 
while he notes that family primaries 
were conducted in local elections, he 
declines to note that these primaries 
have often fragmented these families. 
This is not to deny the role of family in 
Arab societies but only to warn against 
overemphasizing its explanatory power. 
Indeed, Edward Said, in The Question 
of Palestine (1979), warned against the 
essentialism and despair that Hisham 
Sharabi’s ideas may lead to. 
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Jamal introduces the Arabic word 
wajaha to exemplify the persistence 
of traditional social norms. He distin-
guishes between wajaha and delega-
tion of authority. Such a distinction is 
supposed to make the traditional wa-
jaha unique and unlike the “more mod-
ern” forms of political representation 
(p. 155). Jamal condemns Arab politics, 
nongovernmental organizations, and 
academia as highly personalized medi-
ums in which “[c]onstructive ideological 
debate” is lacking (p. 156). However, the 
introduction of wajaha merely mystifies 
the issue. Jamal’s recognition that per-
sonalization is not unique to Arab poli-
tics undermines such generalizations. 
Wajaha becomes an explanation for di-
verse phenomena like “low rates of tax 
collection” and “diminishing” participa-
tion in demonstrations (p. 159). How-
ever, it is unclear why wajaha rather 
than poverty or dysfunctional local gov-
ernment is invoked as a significant fac-
tor for low rates of tax collection. Nor is 
it clear why diminishing political par-
ticipation is a symptom of Arab leader-
ship problems at the time when such 
a phenomenon is evident in non-Arab 
societies.
This discussion of wajaha would 
have benefited from Jamal’s sensi-
tive treatment of patriotism in chap-
ter 3 and the interpretive approach 
he applies to the vision documents in 
chapter 6. Is wajaha a unified, coher-
ent practice or does it mean differ-
ent things for different people? Has it 
changed over time or is it the same to-
day as it was, say, in the 1960s? This 
emphasis on personal and cultural fac-
tors diverges from the suggestion of 
the first theoretical chapter that the 
book’s focus will be on institutional-
structural analysis. In particular, this 
emphasis plays down the importance 
of economic structures.
The books under review participate 
in a conversation on a variety of sub-
jects centering on the nature of Israel. 
The authors should be commended for 
their contribution to this ongoing con-
versation and for shedding a light on 
the plight of the Palestinian minority. 
Jamal’s book offers a promising route 
for an in-depth discussion as it directs 
us to an egalitarian future and a just 
solution to the question of Palestine. 
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